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Metaphor aptness and conventionality: A processing fluency account 
 
Paul H. Thibodeau 
Stanford University 




Conventionality and aptness are two dimensions of metaphorical sentences thought to play an important 
role in determining how quick and easy it is to process a metaphor. Conventionality refers to the 
familiarity of a metaphor whereas aptness refers to the degree to which a metaphor vehicle captures 
important features of a metaphor topic. In recent years it has become clear that operationalizing these two 
constructs is not as simple as asking naïve raters for subjective judgments. It has been found that ratings 
of aptness and conventionality are highly correlated, which has led some researchers to pursue alternative 
methods for measuring the constructs. Here four experiments explored the underlying reasons for the 
high correlation in ratings of aptness and conventionality and raise doubt about the construct validity of 
various methods for measuring the two dimensions. Manipulation of the processing fluency of a 
metaphorical sentence by means of familiarization to similar senses of the metaphor (in vivo 
conventionalization) was found to influence ratings of the sentence’s aptness. This misattribution may 
help explain why subjective ratings of aptness and conventionality are highly correlated. Other reasons to 
question the construct validity of conventionality and aptness measures are observed: For instance, 
conventionality is shown to be context dependent and thus not attributable to a metaphor vehicle alone, 
and ratings of aptness reflect salient non-mapping features as well as mapped ones.  
 
Most people agree that the metaphor Memory is a warehouse is easier to understand than the metaphor A 
fisherman is a spider. But is this because the former is more familiar than the latter or because the metaphor 
vehicle warehouse captures the important features of memory better than the metaphor vehicle spider captures 
the important features of a fisherman? 
Recent work in the metaphor processing literature has identified these two dimensions of metaphorical 
sentences – conventionality and aptness – as candidates for explaining variation in metaphor processing 
fluency, the speed and ease with which people process a metaphor (e.g., Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Clement & 
Gentner, 1991; Glucksberg, 2008; Glucksberg & Haught, 2006a, 2006b; Jones & Estes, 2005, 2006). 
Conventionality reflects the familiarity of a metaphor whereas aptness reflects the degree to which a metaphor 
vehicle captures important features of a metaphor topic. 
It has been argued that gaining a better understanding of how conventionality and aptness impact metaphor 
processing fluency will yield insight into the mechanisms that underlie metaphor processing. Two alternative 
models of metaphor processing have been proposed. One relies on a categorization-based mechanism 
(Glucksberg, 2001, 2008; Glucksberg & Haught, 2006a, 2006b; Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990; Glucksberg, 
McGlone, & Manfredi, 1997; Honeck, Kibler, & Firment, 1987; Kennedy, 1990). On this view, a metaphor 
vehicle is the prototypical member of a dynamically created category and a metaphorical sentence serves to 
identify the metaphor topic as a member of this category. For instance, in the example above, warehouse would 
be considered the prototypical member of the category of “vast but bounded spaces for storage,” and memory 
would be considered an exemplar of this category. Variance in the speed and ease with which people process a 
metaphor, according to this approach, is related to the ease with which this taxonomic relationship can be 
established. That is, if memory is already thought of as a vast but bounded space for storage, then it will be 
considered highly apt and it will be a good fit to the warehouse category. As a result, it will be quick and easy 
to process. 
An alternative model proposes that the mechanisms that underlie metaphor comprehension differ depending 
on the familiarity of the metaphor. This is the career of metaphor hypothesis (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005). On this 
view, novel and conventional metaphors are processed as category assertions (as detailed above), but novel 
metaphors require a relatively more intensive comparison-based process like structure mapping (Clement & 
Gentner, 1991; Gentner, 1982, 1983; Gentner, Bowdel, Wolff, & Boronat, 2001; Gentner & Wolff, 1997; 
Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Indurkhya, 1987; Kittay & Lehrer, 1981; Murphy, 1996; Verbrugge & McCarrell, 
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1977). The theory behind this view is that when people encounter a completely novel metaphor like A fisherman 
is a spider, they have to map the relational structure of spider onto that of a fisherman to understand the 
sentence. In this case, one might liken a patient spider to an enduring fisherman and a spider’s net to a 
fisherman’s line to generate a mental image of the sentence. On the other hand, when people encounter a highly 
conventional metaphor like Memory is a warehouse they may be able to directly retrieve an interpretation from 
memory. 
Recent experimental evidence suggests that both dimensions are important determinants of the processing 
fluency of a metaphor. Several studies have found that the more conventional a metaphor, the faster people 
process it (Blank, 1988; Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Giora, 1997) while other studies have found that the more 
apt a metaphor, the faster people process it (Blasko & Connine, 1993; Chiappe & Kennedy, 1999; Chiappe, 
Kennedy, & Chiappe, 2003; Glucksberg & McGlone, 1999; Jones & Estes, 2005, 2006).  
However, in recent years, it has become clear that operationalizing the two constructs may not be as easy as 
asking naïve raters for subjective ratings. For instance, Jones and Estes (2006) found that subjective ratings of 
conventionality and aptness are highly correlated and possibly confounded. This finding was surprising because 
it had been thought that the two constructs were orthogonal – a metaphor need not be conventional to be apt 
(e.g., Beavers are lumberjacks); similarly, a metaphor need not be apt to be conventional (e.g., The clue is a red 
herring).  
Assuming that the conventionality and aptness of a given set of metaphors is not inherently related, there are 
several reasons why ratings of the two constructs could become so highly correlated. Raters could misattribute a 
metaphor’s aptness for its conventionality. If this were the case, then ratings of aptness would actually reflect 
the conventionality of a metaphor. Alternatively, raters could misattribute a metaphor’s conventionality for its 
aptness, in which case ratings of conventionality would actually reflect the aptness of a metaphor. Or, finally, 
raters could misattribute some other variable to ratings of both constructs. If this were the case, then ratings of 
aptness and conventionality would at least partially reflect some other mediating variable. 
Jones and Estes (2006) take the position that ratings of conventionality actually reflect the aptness of a 
metaphor. They attempt to resolve this confound by utilizing an alternative method for operationalizing 
conventionality (which we call metaphor-vehicle conventionality in contrast to metaphor-sentence 
conventionality). This method involves yoking the conventionality of a metaphor to a metaphor vehicle: for 
instance, according to this approach, all blueprint metaphors (e.g., A syllabus is a blueprint; A game-plan is a 
blueprint) are equally conventional.  
Metaphor-vehicle conventionality is measured in two steps: First, a single figurative property that is 
commonly elicited by the given metaphor vehicle is identified. For instance, blueprint metaphors often highlight 
some notion of “planning,” so we might identify the property “provides a plan” with the metaphor vehicle 
blueprint. Second, raters judge the degree to which this property is associated with the metaphor vehicle by 
rating “how conventional it is to use the concept (e.g., BLUEPRINT) to represent the given property (e.g., 
provides a plan)” (p. 23). Jones and Estes find that this method of operationalizing conventionality yields 
ratings that are not correlated with ratings of aptness, thus successfully differentiating the two constructs. 
However, a potential drawback of this approach, as we detail in Experiments 1 and 2, is that these ratings may 
not reflect a notion of familiarity. Adopting the metaphor-vehicle conventionality approach commits us to the 
view that the metaphor A monkey is a blueprint is just as conventional as A syllabus is a blueprint, which does 
not seem true. 
In this paper, we take a close look at why ratings of aptness and metaphor-conventionality are so highly 
related and explore whether the standard and alternative methods for measuring the constructs are valid and 
reliable. In Experiment 1, we replicate Jones and Estes (2006) finding that subjective ratings of aptness and 
conventionality are highly correlated and evaluate the various methods for operationalizing conventionality. 
Unlike Jones and Estes (2006), we do not argue that conventionality ratings are aptness ratings in disguise. 
Instead, we take the position that people’s metacognitive awareness of the processing fluency of the metaphors 
that they rate bleeds into their judgments of both constructs. Previous work by Jacoby and others has found that 
people tend to misattribute a general sense of processing fluency to abstract target dimensions that they are 
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trying to rate (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Jacoby, Allan, Collins, & Larwill, 1988; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 
1989; Kelley & Jacoby, 1996). That is, raters may unwittingly rate the metaphor A memory is a warehouse high 
in conventionality and aptness not because the metaphor is especially familiar to them or because warehouse is 
a particularly good description of memory, but, in part, because the sentence is easy to process. If this is indeed 
what is going on then it would be problematic to use these ratings to predict reading time (RT) data, since RTs 
are a direct measure of processing fluency.  
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we set out to evaluate two methods of operationalizing the conventionality of metaphors: 
metaphor-sentence conventionality and metaphor-vehicle-conventionality. Metaphor-sentence conventionality 
is measured by directly rating metaphorical sentences for their familiarity whereas metaphor-vehicle 
conventionality involves measuring the rated association strength between a figurative property and a metaphor 
vehicle.  
First, we look at whether these methods yield conventionality ratings that are correlated with ratings of 
aptness. Jones and Estes (2006) find that metaphor-sentence conventionality ratings are highly correlated with 
and possibly confounded by aptness ratings but that metaphor-vehicle conventionality ratings are uncorrelated 
with aptness ratings. 
Second, we compare both types of conventionality ratings to frequency counts of the metaphorical sentences 
in a corpus. Since the conventionality construct is intended to measure familiarity, we should expect to find a 
relationship between the actual prevalence of a given metaphor and its rated conventionality. That is, for either 
method of conventionality ratings to have construct validity, it should reflect the actual pervasiveness of the 
metaphor. Indeed, we believe that pursuing a method for generating conventionality measurements from a 
corpus of natural language would be a worthwhile future endeavor. This would provide a more objective means 
of valuing metaphors along this dimension. However, the approach that we adopt here is only a first step in this 
direction. 
Method 
Participants. Seventy-two Swarthmore College undergraduates participated in the experiment in partial 
fulfillment of a course requirement. All were native English speakers.  
Materials and design. In the analyses below, we will compare data collected by Jones and Estes (2006) to 
data that we gather here. We will use three pieces of data from the Jones and Estes data set: reported metaphor-
vehicle conventionality ratings, reported aptness ratings, and metaphor reading time data, which were 
graciously provided to us by Jones and Estes. We will gather two additional pieces of data here: metaphor-
sentence conventionality ratings and corpus frequency counts. 
All of the data mentioned above was collected on the same set of 128 metaphoric sentences from Jones and 
Estes (2006). The stimulus set was modified from a sample of 100 metaphors that had been used previously for 
similar experiments (e.g., Katz, Paivio, Marschark, & Clark, 1998; McGlone, 1996; McGlone & Manfredi, 
2001). Jones and Estes took the original list of 100 metaphors as a high-apt usage of the 100 metaphor vehicles. 
They created a corresponding low-quality version for each metaphor by substituting a less appropriate topic for 
the original topic. For instance, A rooster is an alarm clock would be the original (reasonably apt) usage of the 
alarm clock vehicle and A robin is an alarm clock would be the low-quality substitution. After gathering 
aptness ratings and metaphor-vehicle conventionality ratings for each of the 200 sentences, Jones and Estes 
selected 64 pairs of original and modified statements to be included in the final set of 128 metaphors. This 
yielded 32 metaphoric sentences in each of the four quadrants of a two-by-two table: high-apt and high-
conventional, high-apt and low-conventional, low-apt and high-conventional, and low-apt and low-
conventional. We emphasize that the “low-apt” stimuli were created with the intention of inducing low ratings 
of aptness, whereas (as we will argue below) it is probably best to classify these, a-theoretically, as “modified” 
variants of the original metaphor sentences. 
To get an approximate sense of how frequently each of these 128 sentences are used in natural discourse we 
used the Google search engine to generate frequency counts for each of the sentences. While we can gain a 
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general sense of frequency from using the Google search engine, it should be noted that there are drawbacks to 
using Google as a corpus (e.g., Kilgarriff & Grefenstette, 2003). 
To gather metaphor-conventionality ratings, we asked each participant to directly judge the conventionality of 
a subset of 32 metaphoric sentences from the set of 128 (eight from each quadrant of the two-by-two table). 
Ratings were made on a seven-point Likert scale. The instructions read as follows: 
For this section of the survey, you will be asked to judge the conventionality (commonness) of a variety of 
simple metaphoric sentences. Expressions can vary in conventionality with respect to any idea that they are 
intended to communicate. For example, consider the following two descriptions of the mind: a 
conventional one, The mind is a computer, and an unconventional one, The mind is a food processor. Both 
of these metaphors make sense and convey a similar idea: Information can be stored and processed and 
digested and swallowed. Nonetheless, the first metaphor, The mind is a computer, is clearly more common 
or conventional than the second one, The mind is a food processor. 
Procedure. Because the metaphor-conventionality ratings task was untimed, participants were tested in 
groups in a classroom. Ratings were made on paper surveys. The session lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
Results and Discussion 
With regard to the metaphor-conventionality ratings, we computed a mean metaphor-conventionality score 
for each of the 128 sentences in the set. The distribution of the mean conventionality ratings ranged from 1.6 to 
7.0. The overall mean rating was 4.27 and the standard deviation was 1.47. We then correlated these 
conventionality scores with aptness ratings, vehicle-conventionality ratings, reading time data, and frequency 
counts of the same sentences.  
With regard to the Google-generated frequency counts, we found that the distribution of frequency counts 
ranged from 1 to 4,420,000. The mean frequency was 89,729 (the median was 2) and the standard deviation was 
502,654. Because the distribution was highly skewed, we log-transformed the frequency counts before 
comparing them with conventionality or aptness ratings. 
Metaphor-sentence conventionality and aptness. Our findings confirmed those of Jones and Estes (2006): 
metaphor-sentence conventionality ratings and aptness ratings are highly correlated, r = .87, t[126] = 20.11, p < 
.001 (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Aptness ratings (as reported by Jones and Estes, 2006) are compared with two methods for rating 
conventionality. On the left, raters judge the conventionality of metaphoric sentences as a whole. On the right, raters 
judge the conventionality of metaphor vehicles alone. 
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This could be because, as Jones and Estes (2006) argue, ratings of metaphor-conventionality actually reflect 
variation in aptness. However, this could also be because when people rate metaphoric sentences for aptness or 
conventionality their overall sense of how easy the metaphor is to process bleeds into their judgment. 
Metaphor-sentence and metaphor-vehicle conventionality. To decouple aptness and conventionality 
ratings, Jones and Estes (2006) relied on ratings of metaphor-vehicle conventionality rather than metaphor-
sentence conventionality. These ratings have the advantage of being uncorrelated with ratings of aptness. As a 
result, it should not be surprising to find that this measure of metaphor-vehicle conventionality is also 
uncorrelated with ratings of metaphor-sentence conventionality, r = .07 (t[126] = .74, p = ns). However, this 
might also signal a problem with the construct of metaphor-vehicle conventionality. 
Conventionality and observed frequency. We found a high correlation between ratings of metaphor-
sentence conventionality and measured frequency, r = .37, t[126] = 4.52, p < .001, and a low correlation 
between metaphor-vehicle conventionality and measured frequency, r = .035, t[126] = 4.52, p = ns. This 
suggests that ratings of metaphor-sentence conventionality are related to the actual prevalence of the sentences 
used in the study but that ratings of metaphor-vehicle conventionality are not. Since metaphor-sentence 
conventionality and aptness ratings are highly correlated, it is not surprising that aptness ratings are also highly 
correlated with this measure of observed frequency, r = .41, t[126] = 5.07, p < .001. Although it may be that 
frequency of use is a result of aptness, it is equally likely that ratings of aptness are contaminated by actual 
familiarity (i.e., metaphor-sentence conventionality).  
RT and Observed Frequency. Log frequency counts (actual conventionality) were highly correlated with 
how quickly and easily people are able to comprehend metaphors, r = -0.249, t(126) = 2.89, p < .01. Although it 
is possible that ease of processing also predicts metaphor frequency, the implication that metaphor frequency 
predicts processing speed provides additional evidence for the value of metaphor-sentence conventionality as a 
theoretical construct.  
Interim conclusions. When analyzed at the sentence level, ratings of metaphor-sentence conventionality and 
of aptness are indeed highly correlated. But both measures are also highly correlated with the observed 
frequency of occurrence of the relevant sentences in language databases, which in turn strongly predicts 
sentence RTs. Given the relationship with observed frequencies in the language, the claim that raters are 
successful at rating metaphor aptness when asked to so, but fail to accurately judge metaphor conventionality 
seems poorly supported. 
 Conversely, although using metaphor-vehicle conventionality ratings instead of metaphor-sentence 
conventionality ratings successfully decouples ratings of the two dimensions, this alternative method of defining 
conventionality does not exhibit construct validity: This may be because the metaphoric sense of alarm clock 
that applies to rooster is not really the same sense that applies to robin (e.g., a rooster is regarded as reliable, 
loud, and connected to a fixed timer – sunrise – whereas none of these properties are associated with a robin.) 
We suggest that ratings of metaphor-vehicle conventionality do not predict the interpretability of metaphoric 
sentences because not all metaphoric senses that employ the same nominal metaphor vehicle are equally 
familiar (i.e., the specific metaphor sense that is evoked by a particular topic can vary quite a bit).  
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1 we found that observed sentence frequency was correlated with reading time. Here we test 
whether the direct manipulation of familiarity with a specific metaphor sense also affects comprehension time. 
In particular, we contrasted the effects of familiarization when applied to the same sense or a different sense of 
a specific metaphor vehicle. 
We adapted a paradigm designed by Bowdle and Gentner (2005) called “in-vitro conventionalization.” 
Bowdle and Gentner found that they could facilitate the processing of a metaphoric sentence by first exposing 
people to examples of similar metaphors (i.e., metaphors that use the same vehicle and instantiate a similar 
meaning as the target sentence). For instance, if the target sentence is Education is a lantern, then the priming 
sentences might read A mentor is a lantern and An encyclopedia is a lantern. Because the prime sentences and 
the target sentence all highlight the power of lanterns to metaphorically light the darkness of ignorance, the 
target metaphor becomes easier to understand. At the same time, Bowdle and Gentner found that literal prime 
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sentences like A camp light is a lantern or A torch is a lantern did not facilitate the processing of a related target 
metaphoric sentence, thereby ruling out the possibility that the facilitation effect was driven by lexical priming. 
To clarify the importance of priming the specific metaphoric sense, we include here another class of prime: 
alternative-sense primes. Whereas same-sense metaphor primes are metaphoric sentences that use a target 
sentence’s vehicle to instantiate a similar meaning as the target sentence, alternative-sense primes are 
metaphoric sentences that use a target sentence’s vehicle to instantiate a meaning that is dissimilar to that of the 
target sentence. For example, an alternative-sense sentence for lantern could evoke the concept of a signaling 
device as in Education is a lantern or A flag is a lantern. 
If, as we argue, the conventionality of a metaphor is specific to its contextual sense, as defined by its 
relationship to the topic of the sentence, then same-sense metaphor primes alone should facilitate the processing 
of related target sentences. 
Method 
Participants. Eighty Swarthmore College and Stanford University undergraduates participated in the 
experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement or pay. All were native English speakers. Data from 
nine participants was not included in the analysis because these participants either did not follow instructions or 
did not complete the experiment. 
Materials and Design. The experiment consisted of two phases: a priming phase and a test phase. Sentences 
for the test phase were taken from the appendix of Jones and Estes (2006) – one sentence for each of the 64 
metaphor vehicles. For each metaphor vehicle, we randomly chose whether to select the Original or the 
Modified version of the sentence; however, we made sure to select 32 Original and 32 Modified sentences. We 
then randomly assigned 16 of the 64 sentences to be “fillers” (8 were Original and 8 were Modified versions) 
and the remaining 48 sentences to be “target” sentences.  
Sentences for the priming phase were created by the authors. Each target sentence (e.g., Education is a 
lantern) was the basis for three types of prime sentences: same-sense, in which a similar metaphoric mapping 
was instantiated (e.g., A mentor is a lantern); alternative-sense, (e.g., A flag is a lantern); and literal-sense (e.g., 
A camp light is a lantern). Two sentences of each type were created for each target sentence for a total of 288 
prime sentences (see the appendix for the complete stimulus set). In our analyses below, we compare RTs for 
target sentences (e.g., Education is a lantern) as a function of the three different types of priming conditions as 
well as an unprimed condition.  
Four versions of the experiment were created. In each case the test phase consisted of the same 48 test 
sentences (plus 16 fillers) and the prime phase consisted of 24 same-sense primes (for 12 of the target 
sentences), 24 alternative-sense primes (for another 12 of the target sentences), and 24 literal primes (for 
another 12 of the target sentences). In each version there were also 12 target sentences that were not primed. 
Between participants, each target sentence was presented in each prime context. 
The participants’ task in the priming phase of the experiment was to rate the metaphoricity – the degree to 
which the sentences were metaphorical – of the sentences on a scale from 1 to 5. We chose this task to ensure 
that participants would carefully read the prime sentences. 
The participants’ task in the test phase of the experiment was modeled on Jones and Estes (2006). Participants 
were asked to read and think of an interpretation of the given sentence. Before each sentence appeared, a 
‘******’ was presented on the screen for 500 milliseconds. When it disappeared, a target sentence took its 
place. Participants were instructed to press the spacebar once they had an interpretation in mind. When they 
pressed the spacebar, they were prompted to type in their interpretation.  
The experiment was implemented in Java. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were given oral 
and written instructions about the nature of the experiment. The oral instructions emphasized speed and 
accuracy as well as the logistics of the computer program. The written instructions explained the task. They 
read as follows: 
On the screens that follow, please read each sentence, think about what it means, and judge how 
metaphorical it is. Indicate a rating from 1 (not metaphorical) to 5 (very metaphorical) by typing the 
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number at the top of the keyboard. Then press spacebar to record your answer and move on to the next 
sentence. 
After the participants completed the prime phase, the program explained the second half of the experiment. 
These instructions read as follows: 
In this part of the experiment, you will again read sentences one at a time; however, this time all of the 
sentences will be metaphorical. Your task is to carefully read the sentence and decide what it means. 
When you have an interpretation in mind, press the spacebar and then type your interpretation into the 
textbox that appears. After you write your interpretation, press the return (enter) key and prepare for the 
next sentence. 
Procedure. Participants were tested in individual testing rooms. The session lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
The order of the sentences was randomized in both the study and test phase of the experiment. However, the 
order of the test phase was set so that the 16 filler sentences were the first 16 sentences of the test phase. They 
were used to acclimate the participant to the test phase of the experiment. We did not analyze data collected on 
the filler sentences.  
Results and Discussion 
Metaphoricity ratings. In designing the study, we were not interested in the metaphoricity ratings of the 
prime sentences per se; however, results from this task can be analyzed to ensure that the metaphoric primes 
(same-sense and alternative-sense) were considered more metaphoric than the literal primes. To test this, we fit 
a linear mixed-effects regression model with random intercepts for subjects and items (Baayen, Davidson, & 
Bates, 2008). T-tests on the coefficients from the model revealed that literal primes (mean = 1.39, sd = .79) 
were rated as significantly less metaphoric than the alternative-sense primes (mean = 3.17, sd = 1.37; t = 57.9, p 
< .001) and the same-sense primes (mean = 3.49, sd = 1.30; t = 48.8, p < .001). It also revealed that same-sense 
primes were judged as slightly more metaphoric than alternative sense primes, t = 9.02, p < .01.  
 
Figure 2. Mean RTs for target sentences grouped by prime-type.  
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Reading times (RTs). Extreme reading times were trimmed so that response times below 50 ms (button-press 
errors) were removed, as were response times above 15,000 ms. Average reading times as a function of Priming 
Condition are shown separately for Original and for Modified metaphoric sentences in Figure 2.  
We conducted the statistical analyses of the RT data with log-transformed RTs to correct for skewness in the 
data. The linear mixed-effects regression model found that participants were significantly faster to read target 
sentences when they were preceded by same-sense metaphor primes than when they were preceded by 
alternative-sense metaphor primes (t = 2.29, p < .05), literal primes (t = 2.15, p < .05), or no prime (t = 2.93, p < 
.01). Although Original metaphoric sentences were comprehended much more rapidly than Modified 
metaphoric sentences (t = 4.73, p < .001), this factor did not interact with prime condition. Adding prime 
metaphoricity to the model as a covariate did not alter the reliability of the various effects. 
These findings replicate and extend those of Bowdle and Gentner (2005). On the one hand, we have 
confirmed that processing one metaphoric sentence can lead to speeded processing of another sentence that 
employs the same metaphor vehicle. This replicates the observation that the experimental manipulation of 
familiarity with a specific metaphor renders similar metaphors easier to understand. However, because we also 
tested alternative-sense primes, we have additionally shown that simply sharing a metaphor vehicle is not 
enough to facilitate the processing of a target sentence. The prime and target metaphors must also instantiate a 
similar meaning. 
Experiment 3 
Given that ratings of aptness were correlated with actual sentence frequency in Experiment 1, it is natural to 
ask whether the priming manipulation of Experiment 2 also has an effect on ratings of aptness. According to the 
definition of the construct, aptness reflects the degree to which the metaphor vehicle of a sentence captures 
important features of the metaphor topic. However, if ratings of aptness are more holistic and take into account 
ease of processing, then the same manipulation that affected comprehension time should affect ratings of 
aptness. That is, priming a metaphoric sense seems likely to influence ratings of aptness. To test this we 
repeated Experiment 2, but substituted ratings of aptness for the comprehension time measure.  
Method 
Participants. Sixty-two Swarthmore College and Stanford University undergraduates participated in the 
experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement or pay. All were native English speakers.  
Materials and Design. The materials used in this experiment were identical to those in used in Experiment 2 
and the design was similar to that of Experiment 2, except that the participant’s task in the test phase of the 
experiment was to generate aptness ratings for the target sentences. Following prior research, aptness was 
defined as “the extent to which the statement captures important features of the topic” (Chiappe et al., 2003, p. 
97) and participants were asked to indicate an aptness rating from 1 (not apt at all) to 7 (very apt). 
Procedure. Because the task was untimed, participants were tested in groups in a computer classroom. The 
session lasted approximately 30 minutes. The order of the sentences was randomized in both the study and test 
phase of the experiment as in Experiment 2.  
Results and Discussion 
Metaphoricity ratings. As in the analysis of Experiment 2, the metaphoricity rating task was designed to 
ensure that participants closely read the primes. As a result, we were not particularly interested in the results of 
this aspect of the experiment; however, evaluating these data affords an opportunity to ensure that the 
metaphoric primes were considered more metaphoric than the literal primes. To test this, we fit a linear mixed-
effects regression model with random intercepts for subjects and items. The model confirmed that the 
alternative-sense metaphor primes (mean = 3.36, sd = 1.37, t = 44.38, p < .001) and same-sense metaphor 
primes (mean = 3.69, sd = 1.26, t = 52.49, p < .001) were judged more metaphorical than the literal primes 
(mean = 1.41, sd = .79).  Additionally, as in Experiment 2, the same-sense primes were rated as significantly 
more metaphoric than the mix primes (t = 6.4, p < .01). 
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Figure 3. Mean aptness rating for target sentences grouped by prime-type. 
Aptness ratings. To analyze the results from the aptness rating task, we fit a linear mixed-effects regression 
model with random intercepts for subjects and items. We found that participants rated target sentences 
significantly higher in aptness when they were preceded by same-sense metaphor primes (mean = 4.43, sd = 
1.95) than when they were preceded by alternative-sense metaphor primes (mean = 4.04, sd = 2.06; t = 4.92, p < 
.001) or literal primes (mean = 4.20, sd = 2.07; t = 3.00, p < .01). Although same-sense priming did not reliably 
increase aptness ratings relative to the un-primed condition overall (mean = 4.33, sd = 2.03; t = 1.51, p = ns), 
alternative-sense primes reliably reduced aptness ratings for target sentences compared to the un-primed 
condition, t = 3.41, p < .01. Thus, aptness ratings for metaphoric sentences are affected by experimental 
manipulations, such as priming, that are irrelevant to the theoretical construct of aptness. 
As can be seen in Figure 3, aptness ratings were much higher for the Original metaphor sentences than for the 
Modified set, but the pattern of priming effects is similar for both. However, whereas the same-sense primed 
metaphors showed no overall increase in aptness compared to unprimed metaphors, within the Modified 
metaphors the contrast between unprimed sentences and those primed with same-sense metaphors was 
marginally reliable, t = 1.87, p = .0621. Including prime metaphoricity in the model did not alter the statistical 
conclusions. 
The principal findings of the present experiment were that (1) priming with the same metaphoric sense led to 
an increase in rated aptness relative to priming with a literal sense, whereas (2) priming an alternative sense of a 
metaphor vehicle led to a reduction in rated aptness relative to the unprimed condition. Whereas we had 
predicted that processing fluency would increase ratings of aptness, the finding that priming an alternative sense 
reduced ratings of aptness implicates the idea that aptness ratings may reflect failures of correspondence as well 
as successes.  
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Experiment 4 
 Aptness nominally refers to the extent to which the metaphor vehicle captures important aspects of the topic. 
Thus, ratings of aptness are intended to measure the degree to which salient features of the metaphor vehicle are 
appropriate descriptions of the metaphor topic. Salient features of the metaphor vehicle that are irrelevant to the 
metaphor are outside the purview of the construct. Yet in Experiment 3 it was observed that participants 
reduced their aptness ratings when they had recently been exposed to an alternative sense of the target 
metaphor.  
In this experiment, we asked raters to list salient properties of metaphor vehicles in the stimulus sentences, 
noting which ones were applicable to the metaphor topic and which ones were not. If ratings of aptness only 
reflect the presence of positive feature overlap, then a model that uses two predictors – one for positive feature 
counts and one for negative feature counts – should be no better than a model with only one predictor – for 
positive feature counts. However, if ratings of aptness reflect a more holistic consideration of the metaphorical 
sentence, then we might expect a model that includes a predictor for negative feature counts to be better than a 
model with only one predictor for positive feature counts. 
Method 
Participants. We recruited sixty-five Swarthmore College undergraduates, all of whom were native English 
speakers, to contribute data in exchange for course credit.  
Materials and Design. They were presented with 128 metaphoric sentences (all taken from Jones and Estes, 
2006) and instructed to list both salient properties of the vehicle that applied to the topic as well as salient 
properties of the vehicle that did not. The instructions read as follows: 
In the following pages, you will read short metaphoric sentences and you will be asked to list properties 
(if any) of the metaphor that capture important features of the subject of the sentence. Where appropriate, 
you should also list salient characteristics of the metaphor that seem inappropriate for the subject. 
For example, for the metaphor My lawyer is a shark, you might list aggressive, dangerous, ruthless 
(cold-blooded), and tenacious as properties of sharks that capture important features of the subject 
(lawyer). You should not list such properties as “is a vertebrate” even though both lawyers and sharks are 
vertebrates. For “miracle”, as in “That I passed that test was a miracle.” You might list unlikely, 
surprising and fortunate. There may also be cases where only one property seems to matter, such as “His 
stubble was sandpaper.” Where “rough” seems to be the intended property. Conversely, if a metaphoric 
sentence seems not to have any appropriate properties, but implies an inappropriate one, such as the 
sentence “His spectacles were sandpaper”, you would list “rough” under the second column of 
“inappropriate implied properties.”  
Procedure. Because the task was untimed, participants were tested in groups in a classroom. The rating task 
was done on paper surveys. The session lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
Results and Discussion 
For each of the 128 items, the average number of positive listed features and negative listed features was 
computed. On average, people listed 1.71 (sd = 0.788) positive features and 1.29 (sd = 0.58) negative features 
for each sentence. We then correlated average feature lists with reported aptness ratings and fit linear mixed-
effects models to the data. As expected, positive features were positively correlated with published ratings of 
aptness (r = 0.43, t[126] = 5.30, p < .001); however, interestingly, negative features were also strongly 
correlated with published ratings of aptness (r = -0.31, t[126] = -3.65, p < .001). Further, a model including 
predictors for both applicable and inapplicable feature counts explained more variance than a model that 
included a predictor only for applicable feature counts, χ2[1] = 2282.8, p < .001. In other words, aptness ratings 
appear to reflect both the presence of salient applicable features and the presence of salient inapplicable 
features. 
For the 64 Original metaphor sentences used by Jones and Estes (2006), the mean numbers of positive and 
negative features were 1.79 and 1.27, respectively (a ratio of 1.4:1). For the 64 Modified metaphor stimuli they 
developed, the two means were 1.62 and 1.34, respectively (a ratio of 1.2:1). Thus, the stimulus set that was 
developed by Jones and Estes (2006) to make a theoretical argument about aptness may have differed in rated 
aptness partly as a result of differences that are not relevant to the theoretical construct of aptness. That is, the 
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Modified metaphor sentences had a greater number of salient metaphor features that failed to map onto the topic 
than did the Original sentences, t[63] = 2.56, p < .05, while having fewer salient metaphor features that 
successfully mapped onto the topic, t[63] = 4.20, p < .001. This observation casts reasonable doubt on the 
theoretical sufficiency of ratings of aptness as an explanatory variable in scientific theories of metaphor 
processing. Ratings of aptness are indeed sensitive to variables that predict comprehension, but it is not clear 
that all of those variables have much to do with the theoretical construct of aptness. Moreover, we note that 
rather than listing a single salient feature (as per the method of generating metaphor-vehicle conventionality 
ratings), the mean number of salient features listed by our participants for each metaphor sentence was 3.  
We do not suggest that this feature listing method directly reflects the calculation that participants make when 
rating the metaphoric sentences for aptness. Rather, we use this data to make the point that participants seem to 
be making a more holistic judgment about the interpretability of the metaphor at hand when they are judging 
aptness and that they may be considering more than one aspect of the vehicle.  
General Discussion 
In this paper, we have found reason to question previous assumptions and methods for operationalizing 
conventionality and aptness. With regard to conventionality, we have argued that the construct cannot be 
defined for vehicles independent of topics. Just because A syllabus is a blueprint is a conventional metaphor 
does not mean that all metaphors that employ blueprint as a metaphor vehicle are equally conventional. We 
speculate that using corpus-based frequency counts could provide a more objective measure of metaphor 
familiarity in the future (although the details of such a method are left for future work).  
With regard to aptness, we find that subjective ratings of the construct (as gathered by Jones and Estes, 2006, 
for example) are sensitive to aspects of metaphors that go well beyond the imputed target dimension of aptness. 
Specifically, they reflect the presence of salient inapplicable properties of the metaphor vehicle as well as 
variation in metaphor processing fluency (i.e., by “in vitro conventionalization”). While the processing fluency 
of a metaphor will likely be impacted by true aptness, it will likely also be impacted by conventionality, the 
salience of inapplicable features, and other contextual factors, which could include perceived ease of structure 
mapping. For example, Glucksberg and Haught (2006a) found that aptness ratings were increased for a novel 
metaphor when an adjective was added that was literally true of the topic (e.g., A billboard is an advertising 
wart.). However the inclusion of such adjectives also delayed comprehension times by about a second, 
suggesting that a more extended process of dynamic category formation may have contributed to a more 
satisfying ultimate alignment.  
Finally, we have also found that subjective ratings of aptness are correlated with corpus frequency (i.e., 
arguably the most direct and objective measure of conventionality), which suggests that part of the reason for 
the high correlation between ratings of aptness and conventionality may be that raters mistakenly attribute a 
metaphor’s familiarity to its aptness, rather than (or possibly in addition to) the other way around.   
How do these findings help us answer the question – what makes one metaphor easier to understand than 
another? We speculate that in order for a metaphor to be used conversationally it must be “good.” If the vehicle 
does not have features that apply to the topic (i.e., it is not apt), then the metaphor will be uninterpretable, and is 
unlikely to be good. If it has some features that apply, but other salient features that do not, the metaphor may 
be confusing and lead to failures in communication. This would tend to make the metaphor seem less good. 
Therefore, we propose that aptness is normally a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a metaphor to gain 
traction in natural language. Specifically, there may be some quality threshold that metaphoric sentences must 
meet in order to become meaningful and prevalent in natural discourse. Arguments from “aptness” however, 
risk being tautological rather than explanatory. If aptness ratings are really measuring perceived metaphor 
quality, then aptness ratings are not explanatory of that quality, but only indicative of it. 
Among metaphors that meet this aptness threshold, it seems to us that conventionalization certainly plays a 
role in determining the speed and ease of metaphor processing. And data from experiments that employ the “in 
vitro conventionalization” paradigm (e.g., Experiment 2 of this paper as well as Bowdle & Gentner, 2005) bear 
this out. Thus, our findings may well support the career of metaphor hypothesis – the notion that in 
comprehending novel metaphors, an interpretation emerges from comparison of the topic and vehicle. However, 
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over time, as metaphoric mappings become 
familiarized, we rely less on the mapping process 
and more on established figurative meanings of 
metaphor vehicles. That the power of metaphoric 
communication resides in their generativity rather 
than merely their aptness is supported by evidence 
that metaphoric mappings of even conventional 
metaphors are alive (Thibodeau & Durgin, 2008). 
Conclusions 
A summary of our chief theoretical results is 
shown in Table 1. In our experiments we have 
shown that conventionalizing (priming) an 
appropriately-used metaphor increases its speed of 
comprehension whereas priming an alternative 
sense of the metaphor decreases its rated aptness. More generally we have shown that ratings of aptness are 
sensitive to the presence of salient features that do not apply to the topic. Ratings of aptness thus do not capture 
the theoretical explanatory construct (aptness) they are meant to measure. For these reasons rated aptness may 
often be a measure of processing fluency rather than a predictor of it. Thus recent claims that aptness-ratings 
explain metaphor processing fluency require re-evaluation. 
In addition, we have argued that the conventionality of a metaphor must be considered in light of the meaning 
that the metaphor vehicle instantiates: Seemingly conventional metaphors can be rendered hard to interpret by 
ill-use. Aptness ratings can provide a heuristic evaluation of metaphor-sentence quality, but insofar as aptness 
ratings are actually measures of perceived processing fluency, they are irrelevant to the evaluation of “aptness” 
as an explanatory construct. In some cases they may even turn out to be measuring the conventionality of a 
specific metaphoric sense (e.g., the weak sense in which a robin might turn out to be describable as an alarm 
clock). 
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Appendix: Stimulus lists 
 
 Target Same Sense (1) Same Sense (2) 
1 A business is a 
living organism. 
A country fair is a 
living organism. 
A super computer is a 
living organism. 
2 A fisherman is a 
spider. 
A sharpshooter is a 
spider. 
An assassin is a spider. 
3 Beavers are 
lumberjacks. 
A termite is a 
lumberjack. 
A woodpecker is a 
lumberjack. 
4 Some bladders are 
barrels. 
Some mugs are 
barrels. 
Some stomachs are 
barrels. 
5 Insults are razors. Rumors are razors. Prejudice is a razor. 
6 Cocaine is a time 
bomb. 
Speeding is a time 
bomb. 
Cheating is a time 
bomb. 
7 Education is a 
lantern. 
A documentary is a 
lantern. 
A mentor is a lantern. 
8 Her ex-husband is 
a gem. 
A great job is a gem. A sibling is a gem. 
9 My computer 
skills course is a 
joke. 
My cooking ability is a 
joke. 
My golf stroke is a 
joke. 
10 His college class is 
a zoo. 
The airport is a zoo. The mall is a zoo. 
11 The driveway is an 
ice rink. 
The marble floor is an 
ice rink. 
The dance floor is an 
ice rink. 
12 Having summers 
off was a bear. 
Flying back from 
China was a bear. 
Doing homework is a 
bear. 
13 A lie is a dagger. Cold water is a dagger. Breaking up is a 
dagger. 
14 The good news 
was an earthquake. 
Victory was an 
earthquake. 
Graduation was an 
earthquake. 
15 A zoo is a 
museum. 
A library is a museum. A botanical garden is a 
museum. 
16 That criminal’s 
pathway is a 
portrait. 
That math theorem is a 
portrait. 
A graph is a portrait. 
17 Some teachers are 
encyclopedias. 
Some game show 
contestants are 
encyclopedias. 
Some grandparents are 
encyclopedias. 
18 My boyfriend is a 
peach. 
My uncle is a peach. My kitten is a peach. 
19 Jalapeno peppers 
are fire. 
Taco sauce is fire. Curry is fire. 
20 Hostility is a veil. Love is a veil. An envelope is a veil. 
21 Music can be 
medicine. 
Poetry can be 
medicine. 
Exercise can be 
medicine. 
22 That football 
player is a rail. 
That power lifter is a 
rail. 
That boxer is a rail. 
23 Alcohol is a 
crutch. 
Drugs are a crutch. Plagiarism is a crutch. 
24 Control is fertilizer Love is fertilizer. Discipline is fertilizer. 
25 A tree is an 
umbrella. 
A roof is an umbrella. A helmet is an 
umbrella. 
Metaphor Aptness and Conventionality 
In press (2011), Metaphor and Symbol 
 
15 
26 Some snores are 
sirens. 
Some whistles are 
sirens. 
Some applause is a 
siren. 
27 That receptionist is 
a breath of fresh 
air. 
That candidate is a 
breath of fresh air. 
The glass of water is a 
breath of fresh air. 
28 An opponent is an 
anchor. 
A friend is an anchor. A goal is an anchor. 
29 His marriage was a 
short leash. 
Daily chores are a 
short leash. 
A two year old is a 
short leash. 
30 The basketball 
player was 
thunder. 
That racehorse was 
thunder. 
That punch was 
thunder. 
31 The Great Plains 
are a board. 
The Sahara Desert is a 
board. 
Calm seas are a board. 
32 Some tears are 
magnets. 
Some lights are 
magnets. 
Some screams are 
magnets. 
33 My young cousin 
is a shrimp. 
My Chihuahua is a 
shrimp. 
My hamster is a 
shrimp. 
34 Grandparents can 
be donkeys. 
Bureaucrats can be 
donkeys. 
Lobbyists can be 
donkeys. 
35 Some fashion 
models are twigs. 
Some greyhounds are 
twigs. 
Some marathoners are 
twigs. 
36 That professor is a 
duck. 
That clown is a duck. That comedian is a 
duck. 
37 Some dogs are 
princesses. 
Some cheerleaders are 
princesses. 
Some professional 
tennis players are 
princesses. 
38 My rat’s fur is silk. A baby's bottom is 
silk. 
A bird's feathers are 
silk. 
39 Books are treasure 
chests. 
A good doctor is a 
treasure chest. 
A big brother is a 
treasure chest. 
40 Many teams are 
jails. 
Some families are 
jails. 
Some high schools are 
jails. 
41 Time is money. Work is money. Sleep is money. 
42 The nearest star is 
a ball. 
An orange is a ball. A globe is a ball. 
43 Ideas can be 
diamonds. 
Paintings can be 
diamonds. 
Houses can be 
diamonds. 
44 Sadness is a 
volcano. 
Anger is a volcano. Joy is a volcano. 
45 The senator is a 
fossil. 
A barber is a fossil. A judge is a fossil. 
46 My grandfather’s 
legs are steel. 
A rugby player's neck 
is steel. 
A bouncer's arm is 
steel. 
47 That bedroom is a 
dump. 
That dorm room is a 
dump. 
That minivan is a 
dump. 
48 Intelligence is a 
warehouse. 
An external hard drive 
is a warehouse. 
A garage is a 
warehouse. 
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 Literal Sense (1) Literal Sense (2) Alternative Sense (1)  Alternative Sense (2) 
1 A mouse is a living 
organism. 
A tree is a living 
organism. 
Friendship is a living 
organism. 
Romance is a living 
organism. 
2 A black widow is a 
spider. 
A tarantula is a spider. A basket weaver is a 
spider. 
A seamstress is a spider. 
3 Paul Bunyan is a 
lumberjack. 
A logger is a 
lumberjack. 
A soldier is a lumberjack. A gladiator is a 
lumberjack. 
4 Some casks are 
barrels. 
Some wooden 
containers are barrels. 
Santa Claus is a barrel. Some sumo wrestlers are 
barrels. 
5 Shavers are razors. Scalpels are razors. Minds are razors. Memories are razors. 
6 Land mines are time 
bombs. 
Grenades are time 
bombs. 
Blackmail is a time bomb. Propaganda is a time 
bomb. 
7 A camp light is a 
lantern. 
A torch is a lantern. A flag is a lantern. A uniform is a lantern. 
8 A sapphire is a gem. A ruby is a gem. A lake surface is a gem. A full moon is a gem. 
9 A knock-knock 
riddle is a joke. 
A prank is a joke. Writing on his face while 
he is asleep is a joke. 
A Whoopi cushion is a 
joke. 
10 The place to see 
lions is a zoo. 
A great field trip 
destination is the zoo. 
An art gallery is a zoo. A jewelry show is a zoo. 
11 A hockey arena is 
an ice rink. 
A frozen pond is an 
ice rink. 
The north pole is an ice 
rink. 
A walk in freezer is an ice 
rink. 
12 The grizzly animal 
was a bear. 
The large predator was 
a bear. 
This case of books is a 
bear. 
This solid oak desk is a 
bear. 
13 A short knife is a 
dagger. 
A small bladed 
weapon is a dagger. 
A pistol is a dagger. A fist is a dagger. 
14 Shaking the house 
was an earthquake. 
The shifting ground 
was an earthquake. 
My parents’ divorce was 
an earthquake. 
The stock market crash 
was an earthquake. 
15 The Smithsonian 
Institute is a 
museum. 
An art gallery is a 
museum. 
My grandmother's jewelry 
box is a museum. 
A time capsule is a 
museum. 
16 A picture of one's 
self is a portrait. 
A president's picture is 
a portrait. 
A skyline is a portrait. A sunset is a portrait. 
17 Wikipedia is an 
encyclopedia. 
This journal set is an 
encyclopedia. 
Some phone books are 
encyclopedias. 
Some textbooks are 
encyclopedias. 
18 This fruit is a peach. This candy flavor is 
peach. 
His cheek is a peach. This blanket is a peach. 
19 The blue flame is 
fire. 
The light in the 
distance is fire. 
Coffee is fire. Fresh pizza is fire. 
20 A black cloth is a 
veil. 
A mask is a veil. A tissue is a veil. An undershirt is a veil. 
21 Tylenol is medicine. Marijuana can be 
medicine. 
Cherry candy can be 
medicine. 
Chalky milkshakes can be 
medicine. 
22 Trains travel on a 
rail. 
This strip of metal is a 
rail. 
That swimsuit model is a 
rail. 
That runner is a rail. 
23 A cane is a crutch. A wooden brace is a 
crutch. 
A column is a crutch. A wide bookshelf is a 
crutch. 
24 Manure is fertilizer. Nitrogen is fertilizer. Broccoli is fertilizer. Sleep is fertilizer. 
25 A waterproof tarp is 
an umbrella. 
A parasol is an 
umbrella. 
Plastic is an umbrella. Gore-tex is an umbrella. 
26 Some horns are 
sirens. 
Some alarms are 
sirens. 
The announcement is a 
siren. 
The news release is a siren. 
27 A deep sigh is a A yawn is a breath of Graduation is a breath of The election is a breath of 
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breath of fresh air. fresh air. fresh air. fresh air. 
28 A large iron weight 
is an anchor. 
A sinker is an anchor. A broken leg is an anchor. Debt is an anchor. 
29 A dog collar is a 
short leash. 
A restraining rope is a 
short leash. 
A ponytail is a short 
leash. 
A sweatshirt hood is a 
short leash. 
30 That loud noise was 
thunder. 
The sound of 
lightening is thunder. 
A crowd's cheer is 
thunder. 
A lion's roar is thunder. 
31 A wooden plank is a 
board. 
A table is a board. A dead body is a board. Arthritic joints are a board. 
32 Some refrigerator 
decorations are 
magnets. 
This iron strip is a 
magnet. 
Some tape is a magnet. Some nails are magnets. 
33 A small sea creature 
is a shrimp. 
A small shellfish is a 
shrimp. 
A swimmer is a shrimp. A diver is a shrimp. 
34 One farm animal is 
a donkey. 
One pack animal is a 
donkey. 
Cashiers can be donkeys. Butchers can be donkeys. 
35 A small tree branch 
is a twig. 
A tiny piece of wood 
is a twig. 
Some stale biscuits are 
twigs. 
Some eggshells are twigs. 
36 That quacking 
animal is a duck. 
That mallard is a duck. Floating trash is a duck. Tugboats are ducks. 
37 The daughter of the 
queen is a princess. 
Some fairy tale 
heroines are 
princesses. 
Some ice skaters are 
princesses. 
Some ballet dancers are 
princesses. 
38 A soft delicate 
fabric is silk. 
A Chinese fabric is 
silk. 
A computer screen is silk. A balk head is silk. 
39 Pirate booty is a 
treasure chest. 
A gold coin container 
is a treasure chest. 
Safe deposit box Vaults are treasure chests. 
40 A detention center is 
a jail. 
A penitentiary is a jail. A $2000 fine is jail. A spanking is jail. 
41 A dime is money. A euro is money. A class president is 
money. 
Tom Brady is money. 
42 A sphere is a ball. This dog toy is a ball. This party is a ball. Playing cards is a ball. 
43 Engagement rings 
are diamonds. 
Expensive jewels are 
diamonds. 
Shin guards are diamonds. A cast is a diamond. 
44 Mt. Vesuvius is a 
volcano. 
Pompeii is a volcano. A chimney is a volcano. The Marlboro man is a 
volcano. 
45 Petrified wood is a 
fossil. 
A dinosaur bone is a 
fossil. 
A stale twinkie is a fossil. Beef jerky is a fossil. 
46 Silverware is steel. A girder is steel. Some facial expressions 
are steel. 
A meditating monk is steel. 
47 A landfill is a dump. A junkyard is a dump. A toilet is a dump. A trashcan is a dump. 
48 A post office is a 
warehouse. 
A factory is a 
warehouse. 
That gym is a warehouse. That office building is a 
warehouse. 
 
